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Regional Integration And Transnational Labor Strategies 
Under NAFTA 
Maria Lorena Cook 
Introduction 
The globalization of the economy and the recent trend toward the formation of 
regional trading blocs pose a fundamental challenge to national labor movements. The 
mobility of capital offshore and across national borders to take advantage of lower labor 
costs has threatened jobs in higher-wage countries and raised charges of labor exploitation 
in poorer nations. Critics contend, furthermore, that regional trade pacts such as the one 
recently created for the North American area grant transnational corporations greater 
autonomy and power at the expense of states and citizens. Labor movements, confined 
within national boundaries by legislation, tradition, and political institutions, are at a 
special disadvantage in defending their interests in this new international environment. 
Nonetheless, global production provides the incentive for labor unions to seek out new, 
collaborative strategies with 4abor in other countries. And regional integration, by 
providing possibilities for direct and regular contact between labor unions, may make 
such transnational strategies more feasible. 
Together with the internationalization of the economy, another related yet distinct 
global trend is the internationalization of domestic politics. This phenomenon has been 
described as the "interpenetration of domestic and international spheres" and the 
"blurring of domestic and external issues," and involves the increased influence of 
international actors on states at multiple points in the political process (Chalmers 1991; 
Pastor 1992; Sikkink 1993). Theinternationalizationof domestic politics has also begun 
to reshape understandings and definitions of national sovereignty in ways that reflect the 
increasing pressures and influences of international actors on states and their policies 
(Sikkink 1993). The issue-areas of human rights, and to a lesser extent, environmental 
protection, are examples where this internationalization and the reshaping of traditional 
concepts of sovereignty are most evident. In formally constituted regional economic 
blocs, such as the European Community (later the European Union) or the North 
American Free Trade Area, the pressures for the internationalization of domestic politics 
would appear to be even greater. 
This paper argues that while the internationalization of the economy has tended 
to weaken national labor movements, the internationalization of domestic politics may 
expand the traditional arenas for strategic action for labor unions. In particular, the 
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North American Free Trade Agreement has been portrayed by some of its many critics 
as representing the consolidation of a neoconservative or neoliberal project that will not 
only shape the future economic development of the region, but also constrain its social 
policies and limit its political options (Grinspun and Cameron 1993: Chapter 1). 
However, these same critics have also noted that the debate surrounding NAFTA in 
Mexico, Canada, and the United States has led to a broad range of contacts and 
cooperative efforts among labor, environmental, women's, religious, and educators' 
groups in the three countries. This process is not only itself an expression of the search 
for new strategies in the context of regional integration, it has also altered the traditional 
ways in which U.S.-Mexican relations have been carried out and shaped the political 
process within Mexico. While the constraints to transnational labor collaboration remain 
strong, these new dimensions of the international and political environments nonetheless 
potentially offer new opportunities to weakened labor movements in all three countries. 
This paper will begin with a discussion of the contours of this new international 
political environment—in particular, the internationalization of domestic politics—and 
how this environment differs from traditional, nationally bounded notions of domestic 
politics and state action. I then discuss how both the transnationalization of politics and 
regional economic integration change the arena for strategic action by labor groups, how 
this new environment affects the labor movement in Mexico, and the kinds of strategies 
Mexican and U.S. labor unions have begun to pursue in this context. Finally, I consider 
whether the side agreement on labor standards that was developed as a complement to 
the NAFTA represents an example of institutionalization of this political 
internationalization, thus potentially facilitating further transnational collaboration among 
unions, or whether, alternatively, the side accord buttresses national institutions and state 
autonomy in ways that could constrain labor's strategic use of the international arena. 
The Internationalization of National Politics: Shifting the Strategic Arena 
Several authors have tried recently to describe and reconceptualize what appears 
to be a new global phenomenon, variously described as the "interpenetration of 
international and domestic spheres" or the "internationalization of domestic politics." 
They argue that what is emerging in domestic and international politics is not adequately 
captured by existing theories of international relations, which tend to maintain the "hard 
division" between domestic and foreign policies and stress the role of the state in defining 
and determining these policies (Chalmers 1991; Sikkink 1991). While the literature on 
"interdependence" comes closer in its acknowledgment of the multiple influences on state 
policies, it tends to ignore the role that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and 
transnational social movements play in favor of the role played by foreign governments, 
international organizations, and transnational corporations (Sikkink 1991:36). In contrast, 
the "internationalization of domestic politics" refers to the pressures and influence of 
multiple international and domestic actors (acting in concert with international allies) on 
the domestic political process. These actors include international organizations and 
foundations, international and domestic nongovernmental organizations, and social 
movements, as well as foreign governments. Thus, in contrast to traditional notions of 
the role of states in international relations, multiple nongovernmental groups, and not 
just states, engage in "international relations" (Chalmers 1991). 
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Those who argue that the internationalization of domestic politics is a new, 
important phenomenon in the world today are quick to point out that states remain 
important and are in most cases the key determinants of domestic and foreign policies. 
Nonetheless, the numerous other groups that act in the international arena and that act 
to influence other nations* domestic policies must increasingly be taken into account in 
order to understand the political processes shaping particular issues in many countries. 
These international influences are also reshaping traditional notions of national 
sovereignty, generally understood as a state's exclusive right to determine what happens 
within its national borders. One issue-area that represents an obvious challenge to 
conventional definitions of national sovereignty is human rights. As Kathryn Sikkink 
(1991, 1993) has pointed out, an individual citizen's appeal to universal standards of 
human rights in challenging his or her own government is probably the clearest example 
of the undermining of national sovereignty. A very different but important example is 
provided by the European Community, where member states have voluntarily ceded some 
degree of sovereignty to supranational institutions within the community. 
In the case of human rights, a range of international actors, including 
international organizations, foundations, and NGOs, as well as foreign governments, have 
been influential in pressuring governments to alter their practices or to investigate 
individual cases of rights violations. Often, these international actors provide support to 
domestic NGOs, granting them a leverage vis-a-vis their own government that they would 
not have otherwise had. The confluence of pressures from international organizations, 
foreign governments, and domestic NGOs/social movements was especially clear during 
the 1970s in Latin America, when, for example, the U.S. administration of Jimmy 
Carter, Amnesty International, U.S. solidarity committees, and domestic groups such 
as the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo generated limited but significant pressure on the 
repressive Argentine military regime to halt human rights abuses. 
Another issue-area where international actors increasingly shape domestic politics 
is the environment. Again, international organizations such as Greenpeace, acting in 
alliance with domestic environmental groups and some foreign governments, are creating 
important pressures on states to address the problem of environmental degradation (Keck 
1991). Whereas the appeal in the case of human rights is primarily a moral one, and the 
assumption is that all individuals, regardless of nationality, possess certain rights, in the 
case of the environment the assumption is that the planet's natural resources are the 
responsibility of all and that states do not have exclusive rights to determine how these 
resources are exploited. In Latin America, moreover, environmental preservation is 
increasingly tied up with the cultural and even physical preservation of indigenous 
groups. The rights of indigenous groups is fast emerging as an issue-area drawing the 
attention of international actors. In these cases, a multiplicity of international and 
domestic NGOs and social movements have pressured national governments to change 
the way they address both sets of issues and have helped to place these issues on the 
agenda of states and international agencies. 
The issue of labor rights shares some of the characteristics of both the human 
rights and environmental issues. The labor rights conventions of the International Labor 
Organization, for example, treat labor rights as human rights in their universality, even 
though signatories to the ILO conventions have often belied this by their actions. Such 
conventions as those concerning forced or child labor may not be followed by all nations, 
yet governments that permit such practices are universally condemned. Still, developing 
145 
country governments in particular have frequently argued, on both national sovereignty 
and economic backwardness grounds, that they have a right to exploit the environment 
or to violate labor rights in the interest of national economic development. They and 
others argue that it is unfair for advanced nations to restrict developing countries' ability 
to exploit their environmental and human resources in order to pass through the same 
stages of development as the wealthier countries. Such an expectation, goes the 
argument, constitutes the imposition of advanced countries' standards on poorer countries 
and has raised charges of imperialism. Thus, the lack of adequate housing or social 
services and low wages is justified because of the stage of development at which a 
particular country finds itself; U.S. and British industrialization, it is argued, were based 
on similar conditions. Here the conflict between universal rights and national sovereignty 
is sharply drawn. 
The formation of regional trading blocs may be diluting the power of this 
argument in relations between richer and poorer countries. National labor movements 
and environmental groups in particular have raised charges of unfair competition in cases 
where trade barriers are lifted between nations of widely varying labor and environmental 
standards. The argument of economic necessity due to a country's low level of 
development has been replaced to some extent by that which says conditions should be 
"harmonized" so as to eliminate unfair advantages for the country that has lower 
standards. The European example in this area has set a precedent for similar demands 
for harmonization in a North American free trade area, in spite of the important 
differences between the two projects. In the case of NAFTA, the Mexican government 
has downplayed its developing nation status and insisted that it wants "trade, not aid", 
even though in the negotiation process it has raised the issue of assistance to meet higher 
environmental standards and it has shown some support for the idea of a North American 
regional development bank that could help ease the adjustment costs of a transition to 
freer trade. Mexico's (ultimately successful) attempts to become a member of the OECD 
and its government's argument that free trade will bring Mexico into the "First World" 
further undermine claims that Mexico needs an exemption from environmental and labor 
standards for its economic development 
Formal regional integration may lend a further legitimacy to discussions of labor 
rights and standards, where the process of economic integration or the internationalization 
of the economy by themselves do not. While the process of Mexico's integration with 
the U.S. economy has been occurring over a period of decades, traditionally there has 
been little concern with (and more than a little misunderstanding about) what happened 
inside Mexico's borders. In particular, U.S. labor, environmental, and other citizens' 
groups had minimal contact with their Mexican counterparts. Throughout most of the^ 
1980s, members of these groups were more familiar with the politics of Central 
American countries and the details of U.S. policy in this region than they were with their 
neighbor to the south, with whom they shared a two thousand mile border. Also during 
the 1980s, however, the expansion of the maquiladora industry, the restructuring of both 
U.S. and Mexican industry, and Mexico's unilateral economic opening drove many U.S. 
companies to Mexico in search of lower labor costs. These developments led some labor 
unions to begin to search for new collaborative strategies with their counterparts across 
the border in order to improve their bargaining position with their transnational 
employers (Middlebrook 1992). There were few such efforts, however, and these were __ 
generally undermined by numerous obstacles, not the least of which were mistrust, 
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cultural stereotyping, and the lack of support for such collaboration among both national 
union leaderships and rank-and-file members.1 
It was not until Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari proposed the 
creation of a North American Free Trade Agreement to President George Bush in 1990 
that labor unions and numerous grassroots groups in the United States, Mexico, and 
Canada became truly interested in one another. In particular, Congress's debate in 1991 
over granting the president fast-track authority mobilized opposition groups with diverse 
interests into forming coalitions in order to defeat fast-track and then NAFTA (Thorup 
1991).2 These coalitions adopted a variety of strategies: They lobbied their 
congressional representatives to oppose fast-track and NAFTA, they educated their own 
members on what they saw to be the dangers of free trade, and they looked across the 
borders for allies. Suddenly, cross-border alliances and coalition formation were seen 
as crucial in the political battle to defeat what had become an important domestic policy 
issue, and not "merely" an international trade agreement. Canadian opponents of the 
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and of NAFTA were especially eager to convince 
Mexican and U.S. counterparts that they should fight to oppose the agreement, based on 
their experience with free trade in Canada. 
The NAFTA debate has acted as a catalyst to the formation of cross-border 
alliances. Since 1990, there has been an explosion of contacts between Canadian, 
Mexican, and U.S. nongovernmental groups.3 These have taken a variety of forms: site 
visits, educational tours and workshops, meetings attended by representatives of 
organizations from the three countries, regular communication and exchange of 
information (aided by faxes and access to computer networks), joint political strategizing 
around NAFTA, solidarity actions around specific conflicts, pressuring of government 
officials and politicians to concern themselves with events in the other country, and so 
on. Cross-border collaboration has taken place at both the grassroots level of people-to-
people contacts and among organization leaders.4 This development of direct, people-to-
people networking in the three countries has been called "citizen diplomacy" and 
represents a novel dimension in U.S.-Mexican relations. Some have argued that this 
citizen diplomacy can act as an important, bottom-up check on traditional diplomatic 
relations and government-to-government exchanges (Thorup 1991; 1993). 
This cross-border coalition formation took place in a unique historical context, 
one in which Mexico's economic and political future had come to depend —as never 
before—on a decision to be made in the U.S. Congress. At the same time, NAFTA's 
passage was by no means a foregone conclusion. This meant that the political process 
in the United States was particularly porous on this issue. Congress was not only 
bombarded by the lobbying efforts of the Mexican government (producing the most 
expensive single-issue lobbying campaign by any foreign government thus far), but also 
by domestic constituencies, especially labor and environmental groups, and by the 
congressional testimony of Mexican citizens—representatives of popular organizations, 
Mexican NGOs, intellectuals, and even individuals who felt wronged by the actions of 
U.S. companies in Mexico.5 Whereas before the international activities of Mexican 
NGOs consisted, in the best of cases, of contacts with foundations or other social 
movements, now they were "lobbying at the centers of political decision making, 
especially the U.S. Congress," where, increasingly, issues relating to Mexico were being 
decided (Hernandez Navarro 1993:10). 
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Government officials and legislators have also crossed borders in recent years. 
U.S. politicians flocked to Mexico, especially the border, to learn more about the 
concerns of their constituents, both those who favored and opposed the agreement. 
Mexican government officials have been especially active in the U.S. political arena. Not 
only did they spend millions on lobbying and influential consultants in Washington, 
D.C., but they targeted the op-ed pages of major U.S. newspapers and traveled 
throughout the country to campaign for NAFTA (Dresser 1993). The Mexican 
government especially tried to win over Hispanics in the United States in the hopes that 
they could act as a strong "pro-Mexico" lobby in Washington. 
The political opposition in Mexico has also campaigned in the United States 
among Mexican immigrants, and announced plans to lobby the U.S. Congress and 
President Clinton on electoral and human rights issues (Hughes 1993a: 12). Competition 
between the Salinas administration and the opposition headed by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas 
for the hearts and minds of Mexican citizens residing in the United States even prompted 
the Mexican government to respond with an international version of Solidaridad, the 
government's public works program targeted at the poor (Hughes 1993b: 13). However, 
it was in the political process and debate surrounding NAFTA that the interpenetration 
of the domestic politics of the United States and Mexico emerged most clearly. 
* That domestic politics have been "internationalized" by NAFTA is especially 
visible within Mexico. A country long ruled by strong nationalist sentiments and 
mistrust for its northern neighbor, Mexico's political leaders have typically bristled at 
any criticism coming from the United States and felt little compunction to address its 
concerns. Because of its proximity to the United States and the history of Mexico-U.S. 
relations, Mexico has clung more steadfastly to notions of national sovereignty than most 
other Latin American nations. These strong nationalist tendencies made themselves felt 
in the economic arena as well as in politics, even though Mexico's economy has always 
been strongly dependent on the United States. However, the gradual opening of 
Mexico's economy in the mid-1980s and President Salinas's strong support for NAFTA 
have made it more difficult to sustain the nationalist discourse within Mexico and with 
other countries. Moreover, economic liberalization and restructuring in Mexico are 
dismantling the regime's domestic support coalition, affecting organized labor in 
particular, which constituted the strongest pillar of support during moments of nationalist 
or statist retrenchment vis-a-vis the United States or even the Mexican private sector. 
The NAFTA political process has made the Mexican government 
uncharacteristically responsive to outside criticism of its domestic policies and has shaped 
the reform process within Mexico. U.S. concerns with Mexico's environmental problems 
and lax enforcement of its laws led President Salinas to revise environmental legislation 
and take a series of strongly visible measures aimed at assuaging these concerns. 
Complaints about corruption, drug trafficking, and human rights violations—issues that 
had led to tensions in U.S.-Mexican relations in the past—led President Salinas to step 
up drug interdiction efforts, clean up the judicial police force, and appoint a former 
human rights advocate to the position of attorney general. On political issues the 
Mexican government has been more tentative. Nonetheless, charges of authoritarianism 
from outside as well as pressure from domestic political opponents have pressured the 
regime to recognize opposition electoral victories in some states and to propose a series 
of reforms, including campaign spending limits and the expansion of opposition 
representation in the senate.6 
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Mexico's authoritarian political system has traditionally constrained the ability of 
domestic political opponents to influence the political process via elections or other 
internal mechanisms. In recent years, however, Mexican political reform has 
increasingly been spurred and shaped by what happens in the United States. In extreme 
cases, a critical article in the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times can lead to a 
speedier change in government policy than years of domestic political pressure. It is little 
wonder, then, that some Mexican intellectuals, labor groups, human rights organizations, 
and opposition parties have used the U.S. political arena to press for change in their own 
country. The Mexican left in particular has overcome historic mistrust in order to build 
alliances with U.S. and Canadian groups. With these allies, they have learned to use 
the U.S. media and learned how the U.S. Congress works. These are lessons not likely 
to fade after the issue of NAFTA passes from the screen. Meanwhile, the NAFTA 
debate has increased the contact points between international actors and the domestic 
political process in both the United States and Mexico, and it has expanded the possible 
arenas available to nongovernmental actors for strategic action on a range of issues, not 
all of them pertaining strictly to NAFTA. 
The Transnational Arena and Labor Strategies 
A wide variety of groups have engaged in cross-border networking and the 
creation of alliances. While labor organizations have also become involved in these kinds 
of activities, labor's participation is both more complicated and in some ways more 
important than that of other kinds of groups. Labor is an especially important actor in 
regional economic integration because one of the chief attractions of Mexico as an 
investment site for U.S. companies is its low labor costs. Low wages and labor 
standards are also among the chief reasons NAFTA's opponents fear the agreement. 
While the environmental question also sparks concern in the United States, no issue is 
so central to what NAFTA is about as the labor issue. 
The central importance of Mexican labor for NAFTA also explains why labor's 
ability to make use of new arenas for strategic action is more complicated than it is for 
other groups. For over a decade, Mexico suffered under the burden of an enormous 
foreign debt, high inflation, and minimal or negative growth. Government leaders 
implemented a program of economic and industrial restructuring that had devastating 
consequences for labor. Real wages declined by 66 percent between 1982 and 1990, 
unemployment and underemployment increased, and government subsidies to basic 
consumer items were cut (Cornelius and Craig 1991). At the same time, labor protest 
was more strictly controlled than in the previous decade—many of the more visible 
strikes were declared illegal or nonexistent; industrial restructuring led to a number of 
layoffs and plant closings that tended to affect more democratic and militant unions; the 
political influence of major labor organizations such as the CTM declined precipitously 
(Cook 1994). Mexican labor organizations thus emerged from the decade of the 1980s 
greatly weakened by the experience. Under President Salinas, the burden of the slow and 
unsteady economic recovery has continued to rest with labor, as the government has 
continued to hold down wages in its fight against inflation. 
Not only Mexican unions' economic weakness but their growing political 
weakness and lack of autonomy also complicate labor's search for new strategies. Most 
labor organizations are subordinate to the government and the ruling Institutional 
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Revolutionary Party (PRI). Union registration is regulated by the Labor Ministry and 
can be highly politicized; determination of the legality of a strike is often a similarly 
political process.7 The largest and most important labor confederation, the Confederation 
of Mexican Workers (CTM), has traditionally operated by elite-level bargaining and by 
exchanging political support and control of worker demands and dissent for political 
positions in the party and Congress and privileged access to the government. It has even 
resorted to violence against its own member unions during labor conflicts. Dissident 
movements within unions are often quickly repressed or contained. In a context of 
economic weakness, often brutal restructuring, declining political influence, and weak 
political opposition, labor unions have become even more dependent on the government 
(and increasingly, the president). At the same time, while the government has tried to 
distance itself from traditional labor leaders who historically have supported the regime 
and has acted to decrease labor's presence in the PRI, it still seems hesitant to break 
completely with labor's support in the ever more complicated presidential succession 
process.8 This continued reliance on labor support therefore gives the labor sector some 
minimal bargaining power and keeps unions interested in supporting the system rather 
than in striking out in opposition to the regime. 
Because of Mexican labor's dependence on the regime, it has been difficult for 
most unions to publicly criticize their government's support for NAFTA either in Mexico 
or abroad.9 At the same time, NAFTA has been widely touted as something that will be 
good for Mexico, bringing more investment, more jobs, lower consumer prices and 
greater consumer choice, better quality products, and eventually, higher salaries. These 
factors make it extremely difficult for Mexican labor unions to campaign actively against 
NAFTA. They have also made it difficult for Canadian, U.S., and Mexican unions to 
find common ground.10 The AFL-CIO's frustration with the CTM's position on this 
issue, for example, led them to initiate talks with a much smaller, less influential, but 
more independent labor federation in Mexico, the Authentic Labor Front (Frente 
Autentico del Trabajo, FAT). 
Nonetheless, a number of cross-border activities have taken place among labor 
unions, and labor groups have used this new, transnational arena to expand their range 
of strategies for protecting their interests.11 The remainder of this section will examine 
the types of strategies that various Mexican and U.S. labor organizations have pursued 
and what factors have influenced their choice of strategies. 
National Political Bargaining 
Peak labor organizations tend to privilege political bargaining with their 
governments as their primary strategy. Although such organizations may also use their 
international alliances, their primary bargaining strength lies in the role these 
organizations play in the national political arena, especially their role in supporting 
political parties. Thus, in the United States this strategy is followed by national officials 
of the AFL-CIO, for whom the Democratic Clinton administration offers more 
opportunities than in the recent past to wield political influence. NAFTA is one of 
several issues in which U.S. labor has an interest; the others include health care reform 
and labor law reform. Because these are issues decided by Congress, national labor 
strategy tends to focus on the legislative arena. 
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The CTM in Mexico has also privileged this strategy of political bargaining in 
the national arena, without generally resorting to the transnational arena in order to exert 
pressure on the government. In part this is so because the leader of the CTM has a 
strong aversion to international "intervention" in Mexico's domestic affairs. Other 
reasons are that the CTM has found little common ground with the AFL-CIO or the 
Canadian Labour Congress on the NAFTA issue, and because the Mexican labor 
organization continues to wield some minimal political influence with its own 
government. Labor continues to play a role (albeit an ever declining one) within the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), in the presidential succession, and in legitimating 
the government's wage-containment policy. Moreover, state-supported challenges to the 
CTM's hegemony within the Mexican labor movement by rival organizations such as the 
Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants (CROC) and the recently formed 
Federation of Goods and Services Unions (FESEBES) have led the CTM to redouble its 
efforts to prove its superior representativeness and capacity for control of worker 
demands to the regime. While U.S. labor organizations tend to target the legislative 
arena under this strategy, Mexican labor targets the executive, reflecting Mexico's 
strongly presidentialist political system. 
Whereas the CTM is the key Mexican labor organization that pursues this 
national political strategy, other organizations have also privileged political bargaining 
with the state. One of these is the FESEBES, the relatively new labor federation that 
became a competitor of the CTM for state favors under the Salinas administration. 
Dominated by the once independent telephone workers' union, the FESEBES traded in 
political independence for the government's support for the new federation and for its 
support in the telephone union's bargaining with the newly privatized telephone company. 
Unions within the FESEBES have also adopted a more varied set of strategies, however. 
They have participated in trinational exchanges with U.S. and Canadian labor and other 
citizens' groups. The telephone workers' union signed an agreement with the U.S. 
Communications Workers of America and the Communications and Electrical Workers 
of Canada, pledging to defend worker rights in the face of regional integration and to 
exchange information on changes in the industry.12 However, such contacts have been 
driven more by the union's effort to prepare itself for bargaining with TeleTonos de 
Mexico than to join in a common effort to defeat NAFTA. The telephone workers' 
union has stated its support for NAFTA, whereas its partners in the agreement are 
opposed. 
The case of another union in the FESEBES further illustrates the important role 
of domestic political alliances in bargaining with the employer. The Mexican Electrical 
Workers' Union (SME), one of the founding members of the FESEBES, is a small, 
35,000- member union representing employees of the Center Light and Power Company, 
a parastate firm facing liquidation. The SME was drawn into a close relationship with 
President Salinas in order to receive his protection and ensure its survival in the creation 
of a new power company. While the SME did participate in trinational meetings and even 
developed its version of a bill of workers' rights to be appended to the NAFTA, it did 
not adopt a strong position on this issue within Mexico because of its need to ally with 
a more powerful partner in the political battle for its survival.13 
Because of their location in services dominated by domestic private capital or by 
the state, most of the unions in the FESEBES are likely to continue in the future to center 
their political strategy within national boundaries rather than in the transnational arena, 
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in spite of their initial contacts with groups outside of Mexico. At the same time, and 
perhaps more importantly, both the SME and the telephone workers union lack the 
political autonomy necessary to build upon external alliances. 
Transnational Collective Bargaining 
This strategy involves cross-border cooperation in bargaining with a common 
multinational employer. While there are numerous cases of cross-border solidarity 
between unions, more concerted strategizing is rare. Nonetheless, one case that has 
received recent attention is that of the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC), an 
AFL-CIO affiliate, and the Sinaloa-based National Farmworkers' Union (Sindicato 
Nacional de Trabajadores Agrfcolas, SNTOAC), a CTM affiliate (Nauman 1993:14; 
Moody and McGinn 1992). Both have agreed to work together to improve conditions 
in each union by assisting each other in collective negotiations with their employer, the 
Campbell Soup Company. According to union leaders, this strategy has proven effective 
in increasing wages and benefits for members in both countries, although Mexican wages 
remain far lower than those of their U.S. counterparts.14 
The FLOC took the initiative to locate its Mexican counterpart in 1987, well 
before NAFTA had even been contemplated, in response to Campbell's threat to buy its 
tomato paste from Mexico if U.S workers made it "too expensive" to do so in the United 
States The U.S. union then developed a strategy that consisted of improving conditions 
for Mexican workers so that the company could not use the disparity in costs against 
U.S. workers. The FLOC approached CTM patriarch Fidel Velazquez to secure his 
assistance in contacting the SNTOAC, and obtained support from both the CTM and 
AFL-CIO to set up a commission for ongoing talks between the two unions. Support 
from both the AFL-CIO and the CTM appears to have been crucial in making this 
transnational cooperation successful. 
Transnational Organizing 
While U.S. unions do not operate inside of Mexico, there are some initial cases 
of U.S.-Mexican cooperation in union organizing, most notably in the maquila industry 
along the border. The maquila sector has the lowest union density of any other 
manufacturing activity in Mexico. Where unions do operate in the maquila, these tend 
to be dominated by the official confederations: the CTM, the CROC, or the CROM. 
In some ways this sector is the most open to organizing by unions, even though there are 
many obstacles. Employers discourage unions, the workers themselves may even shun 
them, and the official unions can be extremely powerful and effective at stamping out any 
efforts to organize workers into more independent or democratic unions.15 
Nonetheless, one independent labor federation in Mexico has begun to try to 
make inroads into the maquiladora sector. This is a relatively small labor federation, the 
FAT, that has been extremely active in the transnational arena.16 In Mexico, it is one of 
the founding members of an anti-NAFTA network called the Mexican Action Network 
on Free Trade (Red Mexicana de Acci6n Frente al Libre Comercio, RMALC). The FAT 
and the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America (UE) have entered 
into what they call a "strategic organizing alliance" and have decided to cooperate in 
organizing maquila workers, targeting those runaway plants that employed UE-
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represented shops in the United States (Witt 1992; Browne and Sims 1993:5). Although 
the unions involved are relatively small and the results so far are mixed, the alliance has 
received a great deal of publicity and has inspired other forms of direct assistance to 
Mexican unions. 
Some indication that transnational organizing is occurring in the agricultural 
sector has also appeared recently. As part of their cooperative strategy, both the FLOC 
and the SNTOAC are working to organize nonunion farm labor in Texas and in south-
central Mexico. The Teamsters are also contacting employees of U.S.-based agricultural 
industries in Mexico's south-central farm belt (Moody and McGinn 1992). Teamsters 
Local 912 from California has been especially active in collaborating with Mexican 
employees of Green Giant, which transferred its vegetable canning and packing 
operations from Watsonville to Mexico. 
U.S. unions have also launched "adopt an organizer" campaigns to support 
Mexican union activists who have been fired for their organizing work. The program 
funds Mexican workers who devote themselves full-time to organizing in the border 
plants. U.S. unions involved in the campaign so far include the United Electrical 
Workers, Teamsters, and UAW locals. Thus far the program has been targeted at a 
Zenith electronics assembly plant in Reynosa and at the Ford plant in Cuautitlan, among 
others (NAWWN 1993:10; Kalmijn 1994; Labor Notes 1994). 
Transnational Solidarity/Networking 
This strategy encompasses different kinds of activities, from participation in 
trinational meetings to solidarity actions in response to specific conflicts, to speaking 
tours and site visits. In the last five years labor organizations throughout the continent 
have engaged in activities of this type. For most these contacts are a starting point, 
leading to closer cooperation with counterparts and to the adoption of one of the 
transnational strategies outlined above. For others, visits and meetings do not lead to 
more formal communication. In any case, the number of contacts that has occurred is 
significant, especially when one considers the sparse communication among Canadian, 
U.S., and Mexican unions prior to 1990, especially at the grassroots level. 
For many, a series of trinational exchanges that brought together leaders and 
representatives from a broad range of unions and nonlabor organizations provided the 
initial contact. In these trinational meetings participants discussed free trade, what 
positions groups should adopt, and whether and how they should cooperate in defending 
their interests (see Eisenstadt 1993).17 Participants stressed that NAFTA did not only 
represent a threat to jobs, wages, and working conditions, but also an opportunity to 
develop trinational connections in order to help shape the continuing process of 
integration (Trinational Exchange 1991:3). In the first meeting, the Mexican side 
included top representatives from some of the principal labor organizations in Mexico, 
including the telephone workers, the electrical workers, the airline pilots' association, and 
the teachers' union, as well as representatives of the FAT and of the CTM. This meeting 
marked one of the first in which both official and independent union representatives 
appeared together. From the labor movement on the U.S. side were representatives from 
the Communications Workers of America (CWA), United Auto Workers (UAW), 
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers' Union (ACTWU), International Ladies' 
Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU), the AFL-CIO, and the Coalition for Justice in the 
153 
Maquiladoras, the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE), and the Farm Labor 
Organizing Committee FLOC. 
Several intra-industry meetings have also been set up in the auto sector, including 
one by the Chrysler-Ramos Arizpe union and the CTM, to which U.S. and Canadian 
unions were invited (Middlebrook 1992), and another sponsored by the Transnationals 
Information Exchange in Mexico in 1991. At the TIE meeting, auto workers from the 
Big Three (Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors) discussed developing action plans by 
company and formed a trinational committee to coordinate industrywide cooperation and 
networking (Moody and McGinn 1992). Canadian, U.S., and Mexican electrical 
workers' unions also met in Mexico in February 1994 to discuss common concerns. This 
meeting was significant, given that the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
(IBEW) and the Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas (SME) carry more clout in their 
respective countries than either the UE or the FAT.18 
Labor conflicts at U.S. auto plants in Mexico have drawn the attention of the 
UAW and the AFL-CIO and led them to lodge complaints about the handling of such 
conflicts. Among the most important of these cases has been the ongoing series of 
conflicts at the Ford plant in Cuautitlan, outside of Mexico City. In 1990, the struggle 
over union representation left one worker dead at the hands of hired thugs who ambushed 
workers at the plant.19 The case revealed the collusion of the Mexican government, Ford 
Motor Company, and the CTM in the repression of labor dissent and of union democracy 
in Mexican plants.20 The publicity this case received and the degree of solidarity shown 
by U.S. unions was unprecedented. The Canadian Auto Workers and some UAW locals 
lent their support by publicizing the events in their own countries, pressuring government 
officials to complain about the matter, and by organizing a trinational day of protest in 
which workers wore black ribbons on the anniversary of the Mexican auto workers' 
death. The UAW locals in St. Paul and in Kansas City, Missouri, were especially active 
in organizing support for Cuautitlan workers; they formed a Mexico-U.S.-Canada 
Solidarity Task Force and sent members to Mexico to witness union elections in 1991. 
The national UAW, meanwhile, was initially reluctant to engage in a nationwide 
campaign (Browne and Sims 1993:6). These UAW locals and other U.S. groups 
continue to follow events at Ford-Cuautitlan. With the help of the North American 
Worker-to-Worker Network and electronic networks, supporters have begun to adopt the 
kinds of international action campaigns (telegrams to Mexican labor authorities and 
political leaders) that Amnesty International has long engaged in to draw attention to 
human rights violations around the world (NAWWN 1993:26).21 
In the Cuautitlan case, Mexican auto workers chiefly received support in their 
fight for union democracy; collaborative collective bargaining or other kinds of issues 
were not at the forefront (Middlebrook 1992). Such demonstrations of solidarity 
nonetheless annoyed the Mexican government and the CTM, both of which threatened 
the workers and pressured them to abandon their external alliances.22 However, in 
subsequent bargaining with Ford, the Cuautitlan union was able to draw on added 
leverage gained through external alliances. It agreed not to enlist the help of U.S. allies 
if Ford would meet some of its demands during collective bargaining. Authorities have 
discouraged similar cooperative measures from being taken by auto workers at the Ford 
plants in Chihuahua and Hermosillo (Middlebrook 1992). 
In another case from the auto industry, workers from the Volkswagen plant in 
Puebla, Mexico, enjoyed the support of their German counterparts during a long strike 
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in 1987. The German workers refused to step up production to compensate for the loss 
due to the strike in Mexico (Garza and M&idez 1987b). This solidarity helped the union 
to escape the fate that befell other auto unions in that year. Managers at the Ford-
Cuautitlan auto plant, for example, fired the workers during a strike, closed down the 
plant, and later reopened, rehiring some of the workforce at lower benefit and wage 
levels and with new work rules (Garza and Mendez 1987a; Middlebrook 1989:86, 92). 
Workers at Volkswagen were nonetheless confronted with these same tactics and finally 
defeated during their 1992 strike (Nauman 1992; Othdn Quiroz and Mendez 1992). 
During a strike in 1990 at the Modelo Brewery, Teamsters in Chicago supported 
the strike by refusing to deliver shipments of the imported beer. A boycott of the 
product saw limited success in the United States, but was somewhat more successful in 
Canada and Europe. The Modelo workers belonged to a CTM-affiliated union, and their 
enlistment of foreign support drew the wrath of Fidel Velazquez, who also did everything 
in his power to defeat the strike (La Botz 1992). Other solidarity actions included a 
corporate campaign by Teamsters Local 912 against Green Giant products in cooperation 
with striking Mexican employees of the company (Moody and McGinn 1992:48). 
The number of site visits and other kinds of exchanges and collaboration that 
have occurred in recent years are too numerous to mention here, but some examples 
include the establishment of U.S. and Mexican "sister schools", arranged between U.S. 
teachers and Mexican teachers belonging to the National Coordinating Committee of 
Education Workers, a large dissident current within the National Teachers Union (Witt 
1992). Announcements for tours to Mexico for U.S. labor groups and others cover the 
pages of publications such as the Free Trade Mailing, and the Detroit-based Labor Notes 
sponsored a Cross-Border Organizing Strategies School on the Mexican border in May 
1994. 
The maquiladora region has received particularly strong attention since the 
NAFTA vote. One maquiladora in Tijuana, P12sticos Bajacal (a division of Boston-based 
Carlisle Plastics), first received publicity prior to the NAFTA vote when a bus of U.S. 
union activists and observers tried to visit the plant and were turned away by plant 
management. In December 1994 human rights and union observers witnessed union 
elections at the maquiladora plant. The company had signed a contract with a union 
affiliated with the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM); workers only 
learned of the existence of this union once they sought to organize themselves under the 
auspices of another labor organization, the Revolutionary Labor Confederation (COR). 
During the representation election, workers were forced to vote out in the open and made 
to sign their names beside their vote. Elections were finally halted because it was feared 
that plant managers would retaliate against the dissident workers. U.S. observers, 
shocked and frustrated by what they had witnessed, felt that by publicizing the case they 
were at least able to prevent retaliation against the COR supporters (Bacon 1993; Kalmijn 
1994). 
A couple of additional cases that received much publicity in the United States 
during the winter of 1993-94 were theTirings of workers who had been trying to organize 
a union at a General Electric maquiladora plant in Ciudad Juarez and at Honeywell in 
Chihuahua. In both cases, the organization trying to organize the workers was the 
independent FAT. Its allies in the United States, the UE and the Teamsters, reacted 
quickly to the firings. UE leaders wrote to the U.S. Congress and pressed General 
Electric to reverse its position. Teamsters began carrying out leafleting campaigns at 
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General Electric plant in the United States; both unions are giving financial support to 
the FAT. In January 1994, the unions finally succeeded in getting General Electric to 
reinstate six of eleven workers who had been fired in Ciudad Juarez. Efforts continued 
to force the company to reinstate the remaining fired workers. Teamsters president Ron 
Carey wrote President Bill Clinton, warning him that unless the labor violations at the 
Honeywell and General Electric plants were resolved, they could become "an 
international symbol of the violations of human rights now that NAFTA has passed."23 
The UE is also trying to get Congress to begin an investigation into the labor practices 
of U.S. corporations in Mexico {Labor Notes 1994:14). 
Perhaps most significant, on February 15, 1994, the UE and Teamsters became 
the first unions to file complaints to the new National Administrative Office (NAO) set 
up under the terms of the NAFTA labor side agreement (Rose 1994:A2). The U.S. 
unions argued that by firing the union organizers, the U.S. companies in Mexico were 
violating the spirit of the trade agreement. In April 1994 the U.S. NAO decided to 
accept the submissions and planned to hold hearings on the cases later in the year. The 
evolution of these cases will set an important precedent for subsequent filings, and may 
indicate whether the new institutions set up by the side accords will complement or 
complicate grassroots alliances and organizing efforts. 
Political Bargaining in the Transnational Arena 
Another strategy that some labor groups have adopted involves political 
bargaining in the transnational arena. This strategy was directly linked to the NAFTA 
debate, and involved both direct and indirect lobbying of U.S. congressional 
representatives by Mexican groups. Indirect lobbying occurred through the exchange of 
information and networking with U.S.-based organizations, which then pressured the 
U.S. Congress. Direct efforts included congressional testimony by individuals and 
representatives of Mexican groups who reported on conditions for workers in Mexico. 
The strategy was largely aimed at defeating NAFTA in the U.S. Congress and with the 
U.S. public, although it also helped to secure support for side agreements and 
consideration of compensation mechanisms for likely "losers" of free trade. 
At the same time, because of the Mexican government's sensitivity to outside 
criticism, Mexican coalitions such as the Mexican Action Network were able to gain 
access to their own government because of the attention they received and the role they 
played in the United States debate on NAFTA. Under circumstances in which the 
network would not otherwise have played much of a political role within the country, its 
use of transnational spaces gave it greater leverage within national boundaries. To the 
extent that the network has played a role in providing information about Mexican labor 
and environmental conditions to the U.S. Congress, unions, and other groups, it has also 
acted indirectly to reform domestic politics in Mexico, precisely because the Mexican 
government has acted to preempt criticism of Mexican practices by those who would 
decide NAFTA's fate. 
Transnational political bargaining represents a new strategic arena for labor and other 
groups in Mexico. As with its counterparts in the United States and Canada, the 
Mexican Action Network is composed of a diverse set of organizations that have come 
together through their loose opposition to the NAFTA. As such, after the NAFTA vote 
is over, it is unlikely that much will hold these coalitions together. In the meantime, 
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however, the use of the transnational arena by the Mexican groups has raised their 
visibility and political effectiveness. This is significant given that the network represents 
a small but burgeoning set of independent popular organizations and single-issue groups, 
such as environmentalists and human rights groups. The alliances they have forged and 
the skills they have learned over the last few years may bode them well in future 
negotiations with the Mexican government on human rights, the environment, and even 
democratization. Within this coalition, labor groups are perhaps the most constrained, 
given the political controls on labor and the current economic vulnerability of unions. 
In addition, it would appear that only those labor groups with weaker ties to official labor 
organizations and the government, and which otherwise are too small or nonstrategic to 
represent a significant political or economic threat, are free to participate in such 
activities. 
NAFTA and the Side Agreements 
The concerns of U.S. labor unions, the election of a Democratic president in 
1992, and pressure by a host of citizens' groups throughout the electoral campaign led 
to the negotiation of labor and environmental side accords to accompany the NAFTA. 
The inclusion of these accords reflected the new administration's efforts to make NAFTA 
more palatable to opponents by addressing concerns over the deterioration of 
environmental conditions and lower environmental and labor standards in Mexico. Such 
lower standards, it was argued, would make for unfair competition, would tend to drive 
U.S. standards down, and would cause further exploitation of the environment and of 
Mexican workers. 
From the beginning, the negotiation of the side deals was a tricky issue, and one 
more aimed at assuaging U.S. congressional opponents and key lobby groups than 
ensuring a commitment to higher standards. Both the Canadian and Mexican 
governments were opposed to the idea of side agreements and to the need for them, and 
feared that some of the enforcement mechanisms and institutional arrangements being 
suggested in side accords would threaten "national sovereignty." U.S. negotiators 
therefore had a very difficult task: to appease moderate critics of NAFTA in order to 
secure congressional approval, while not alienating the Canadian and Mexican 
governments. 
Nor had it been made publicly clear what was meant by "labor standards." In 
a preliminary report on the draft options presented by an interagency subgroup of the 
National Economic Council, possible scenarios for the side agreements ranged from the 
inclusion of a broad definition of labor rights and standards, such as tying wages to 
productivity and securing the right to organize and to collective bargaining, to a minimal 
treatment of labor standards (or "basic rights"), such as ensuring enforcement of child 
labor laws and health and safety standards.24 Similarly, positions wavered regarding the 
nature of the institutions that would be set up to oversee compliance with these standards, 
as well as the nature of the enforcement mechanisms. Through it all, U.S. Trade 
Representative Mickey Kantor repeatedly insisted that the side accords would "have 
teeth." 
The NAFTA debate and discussion surrounding the side accords brought attention 
to a series of problems that afflict Mexican labor: low wages, lax enforcement of child 
labor laws and of health and safety standards, and political restrictions on the right to 
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strike, to organize, and the right to choose one's union representatives. The labor side 
accord offered the possibility to address some of these issues by, ultimately, subjecting 
allegations of rights violations to a supranational institution for scrutiny. Provided that 
individual workers and labor union locals as well as unions could file complaints with the 
commission, such an arrangement offered the promise of institutionalizing a process of 
external scrutiny that was begun with the NAFTA debate and which has been shown to 
be more effective than domestic pressure alone. Thus, the final outcome of the labor side 
agreement—its definition of labor standards, institutional arrangements, and enforcement 
mechanisms—could be crucial for determining whether it would indeed be able to help 
improve the conditions of workers in Mexico. If, on the contrary, the labor side accord 
merely paid lip service to labor standards and contained meek enforcement mechanisms, 
then the result for Mexican workers could be worse than if no accord existed. 
Negotiations among the three governments over labor and environmental side 
accords were completed on August 13, 1993, and the final text of the accords appeared 
one month later. Based on this text and available summary analyses, the labor side 
accord appears to fall far short of what would be required to ensure effective enforcement 
of laws and respect for labor rights.25 Labor and environmental leaders and many 
Democratic politicians indicated that the accords would not affect their opposition to the 
trade agreement, while business leaders in the U.S. and Mexico expressed satisfaction 
with the accords (Andrews 1993). 
The key problem with the labor side accord is that it is unlikely to address 
conditions among Mexican workers that constitute unfair competition for U.S. workers. 
There are several problems with the accord as it is now written that lead me to this 
conclusion: 1) The restricted scope of the labor side agreement; 2) the lengthy dispute 
settlement process; 3) weak enforcement provisions; and 4) the limited political autonomy 
of the commission. 
The restricted scope of the agreement is probably its most troublesome aspect. 
According to the labor side accord, persons or organizations can file complaints relating 
to a persistent pattern of failure to enforce domestic laws in the areas of child labor, 
health and safety, and the minimum wage, and in areas that affect trade between the 
parties. Aspects of industrial relations, such as the rights to strike, organize, and bargain 
collectively are not subject to the dispute settlement process contemplated in the accord. 
In addition, the parties to the accord agree to enforce their existing laws; there is no 
reference to the creation of new legislation nor to harmonization of standards. The 
problem with this narrower definition of labor standards is that it provides no recourse 
beyond that which already exists for unions and workers whose rights to organize, strike, 
and bargain collectively are curtailed by employers and by the Mexican government. 
These restrictions have long prevailed in Mexico, in spite of labor legislation that 
prevents it and in spite of Mexico's participation in ILO conventions covering these 
areas. Violations of rights to organize and to strike are especially common in the 
maquiladora sector, for instance, but violations have also occurred throughout more 
advanced sectors, such as the auto industry. Removing industrial relations from the 
scope of the accord thus protects the Mexican government from external scrutiny of its 
political control over labor unions, an aspect that it has clearly declared corresponds to 
"national sovereignty." 
Other problems relate to the dispute settlement process and enforcement. The 
process itself is constructed so as to not reach the point of fines or trade sanctions. 
158 
Instead, consultations among ministers will be the likely response for the majority of 
complaints. Any member of the Ministerial Council may petition the others to create an 
evaluation committee of experts (ECE) to study a particular issue, as long as it falls 
under the restricted category of rights described above. A pattern of failure to enforce 
any of the other domestic labor laws mentioned in the agreement's preamble, which lists 
a broader set of rights, is technically not subject to investigation. After an ECE submits 
its final report (a process which can take three hundred days on the outside), the council 
resorts to consultations. If the matter remains in dispute, then two out of three members 
of the council may vote to establish an arbitral panel. The arbitral panel would 
investigate the dispute further and, if it finds that the party violated the agreement, then 
the Parties would discuss an action plan to be undertaken by the Party complained 
against. If the action plan is not implemented or does not remedy the problem, then any 
Party can request that the arbitral panel be reconvened. The arbitral panel could 
eventually impose a "monetary enforcement assessment," and, if the fine were not paid, 
it could ultimately suspend NAFTA benefits in an amount no greater than that needed to 
collect the monetary enforcement assessment. Counting from the time a complaint is first 
investigated until sanctions are applied, the process can take as long as three years. 
Mexican Commerce Secretary Jaime Serra Puche assured members of his party that it 
was highly unlikely that a dispute would ever reach this stage. 
Neither the threat of sanctions nor the fine are likely to be much of a deterrent 
to any of the governments. A fine of up to $20 million can be levied against the 
offending party; no minimum has been set. The fine is to go into a fund from which the 
violating government may then draw and apply toward enforcement. The assumption 
behind this arrangement is that failure to enforce one's own laws is a problem of lack 
of resources, not of political will. 
A final problem mentioned here has to do with the lack of political autonomy of 
the labor commission. The key institution is a ministerial council, made up of the three 
labor ministers. It is the ministerial council that calls for investigations and if conditions 
warrant, sets up the arbitral panels from a previously agreed-upon roster of "experts." 
Since initiatives for investigation of violations must either come from the ministerial 
council or be approved by it, the potential for government political interests and foreign 
diplomacy concerns to intervene, as well as the possibility of retaliation in calling for 
investigations, is likely to restrict serious consideration of violations by any of the 
parties. The remainder of the labor commission is to be made up of a trinational 
International coordinating secretariat, one for labor and one for the environment, which 
would be set up to carry out the day-to-day work of the commission and would be 
overseen by the ministerial council. Each government is also responsible for setting up 
a national administrative office (NAO) in its respective country. Presumably, the NAO 
would receive complaints ("conduct preliminary reviews") on labor law matters arising 
in the territory of another party, consult with other NAOs, and distribute information 
regarding the labor commission. Details concerning the composition and activities of the 
NAOs are left to each government to work out. 
Because the labor side accord's scope is restricted to a minimum definition of 
standards, it may be much more difficult for complaints regarding other labor rights to 
acquire legitimacy, even if they have a demonstrable effect on trade. It also appears 
unlikely that the scope would be expanded any time soon. During the negotiations, the 
United States might have been able to extract such a concession from the Mexican 
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government. However, after NAFTA's ratification the United States lost the key bit of 
leverage it had to negotiate —the fact that NAFTA had not yet been approved. While 
formalized free trade with Mexico may permanently raise international levels of concern 
over what happens within Mexican borders, it is also true that the NAFTA debate and 
process opened a limited window of opportunity in which to secure institutional changes 
that could offer greater protection to workers in all three countries. It appears that, with 
the final terms of the side agreements, that opportunity has now been lost. The 
institutional arrangements put in place by the side accords may well restrict the labor 
strategy of political bargaining in the transnational arena and reinforce traditional 
domestic strategies. Moreover, unions that try to employ transnational collective 
bargaining and organizing and that try to carry out solidarity around these issues are not 
likely to find institutional protection for such strategies at the supranational level.26 
Conclusion 
The internationalization of domestic politics refers to the growing tendency for 
nongovernmental actors to engage in "international relations," acting in ways that help 
to shape the practices and policies of national governments. This internationalization also 
involves domestic interest groups and social movements forming alliances and 
coordinating strategies with external actors in order to better bargain with their own 
governments and influence change within their own countries. This confluence of 
external and internal pressures acting on national governments is especially important in 
cases of authoritarian regimes, where other, national mechanisms for pressing for reform 
may be limited. Examples of domestic policies and practices increasingly shaped by 
international nongovernmental forces can be found in the areas of human rights, 
environmental protection, and to a lesser extent, labor rights. Formal economic 
integration such as that occurring in Europe and under NAFTA also expands the 
opportunities for international actors to shape domestic politics. While the free trade area 
set out in NAFTA does not go as far as the economic union represented by the European 
Union, the NAFTA debate has nonetheless expanded the range of nontrade issues under 
discussion and heightened the Mexican government's sensitivity and responsiveness to 
external criticism. 
The debate surrounding NAFTA has also led to an explosion of cross-border 
contacts, alliances, and activities among grassroots actors, representing something quite 
new in U.S.-Mexico relations. What might have started as a search for allies in order 
to defeat NAFTA, in some cases has developed into cooperation among unions operating 
within the same industry or sharing the same multinational employer. With the passage 
of NAFTA, there is an added incentive for these kinds of cooperative relations to 
continue. Nonetheless, with few exceptions it is not yet clear what outcomes the various 
activities and strategies described above will produce, nor how effective they will be. 
Nor is it yet clear whether the end of the NAFTA debate after the vote has closed off an 
important part of this transnational arena, or whether the institutions and procedures set 
up by the NAFTA side agreements will displace the kinds of grassroots activities that 
have been occurring so far. Moreover, numerous factors shape the likelihood that labor 
groups will pursue a transnational strategy, aside from whether or not there is a 
counterpart on the other side of the border. We have seen here that such factors as the 
nature of the industry (for example, the presence of multinationals), the size and 
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organizational structure of the union (for example, small vs. large; autonomy from 
national union leadership), and the labor organization's political role within the labor 
movement (and its relationship with the government) shape the likelihood that a particular 
union will include a transnational strategy in its repertoire. In any case, while NAFTA 
has greatly concerned labor, environmental, and other citizens' groups throughout North 
America because of the power it was seen to grant to multinational corporations, the 
NAFTA debate has simultaneously expanded the arena for strategic action by these 
groups. What use is made of this new arena is up to them. 
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Endnotes ' 
1. On the history of AFL-CIO's relationship with Mexican unions, especially its 
treatment of independent unions, see Browne and Sims 1993. 
2. In Mexico, a coalition called the Red Mexidana de Acci<5n Frente al Libre Comercio 
(Mexican Action Network on Free Trade, RMALC) was formed in 1991. Its U.S. 
counterparts included the Fair Trade Campaign, Citizens' Trade Watch Campaign, and 
the Alliance for Responsible Trade (formerly the Mobilization on Development, Trade, 
Labor and the Environment, MODTLE); in Canada they were the Action Canada 
Network and Common Frontiers. 
3. Where before the focus of Mexican NGO relations had been in Europe, it has now 
moved to the United States and Canada (Hernandez Navarro 1993:4). 
4. For a discussion of some of these cross-border efforts, seeThorup 1991; Brooks 1992; 
the Spring 1993 issue of Enfoque: and Browne et al. 1994. 
5. In one case, a woman fired from her job at a General Electric maquila due to prior 
union organizing activities was brought to the United States to testify before the U.S. 
Senate; the United Electrical Workers, Teamsters, and Jobs with Justice were active in 
bringing her to the United States. 
6. The Chiapas rebellion on January 1, 1994, is likely to produce further moves in the 
direction of political reform. The pact among political parties agreed to on January 27, 
1994, is an example of the political reform ramifications of the uprising (see Eaton 
1994:1 A). 
7. For some examples during the Salinas administration, see La Botz 1992. 
8. For a more detailed discussion of state-labor relations under the Salinas administration, 
see Cook forthcoming. 
9. On the broader political restrictions in debating NAFTA within Mexico, see Aguilar 
Zinser 1993. 
10. See, for example, the various positions expressed by Canadian, U.S., and Mexican 
labor groups during the first trinational exchange, held in Chicago in 1991 (Trinational 
Exchange 1991). 
11. This essay does not consider the role of international secretariats and focuses instead 
on direct contacts among national labor organizations, unions, and union locals. On the 
problems faced by the International Metalworkers' Federation in Mexico during the 
1960s and 1970s, see Middlebrook 1992:21-22. 
12. A copy of the agreement is reprinted in Latin American Labor News, issue 5, 1992, 
p. 7. 
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13. See Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas, "Carta Internacional de Derechos Sindicales 
y Laborales a Incluirse en el T.L.C." July 30, 1991. 
14. Here the unions have been pushing for wage "parity" by comparing the relationship 
between wages and cost-of-living in each country. 
15. On unionization in the maquiladora sector, see Hualde 1994 (this volume). 
16. The FAT has the added characteristic of being an independent organization that has 
NGO status. For these reasons, the FAT does not have the same kinds of political 
commitments to the regime that other Mexican unions do. 
17. An outgrowth of these trinational meetings was a NAFTA congress held in Mexico 
in 1991 at the same time as official negotiations on the agreement were taking place, 
sponsored by the Mexican Action Network on Free Trade, during which a "social 
charter" was developed (RMALC 1992). 
18. Reported in SourceMex (University of New Mexico electronic mail news service), 
February 16, 1994. 
19. For an account of this case, see La Botz 1992, and Americas Watch 1990:67-70. 
20. See La otra cara de Mixico, no. 21, May-June 1991, pp. 4-5. 
21. In a "post-NAFTA-vote" strategy session, the North American Worker to Worker 
Network, a coalition of local unions and labor-related NGOs, decided to support 
independent union organizing in Mexico through a variety of tactics, including an 
"Emergency Response Network" of people who will send faxes, telegrams, and take out 
newspaper ads in the event of illegal firings or harassment of Mexican independent labor 
organizers. 
22. La Botz 1992; "Weekly Commentary," ARKA Mexico Report, August 21, 1992. 
23. Reported in SourceMex (University of New Mexico electronic mail news service), 
February 16, 1994. 
24. See Inside U.S. Trade, Special Report, March 5, 1993. 
25. See the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, and Levinson 1993. 
26. Nonetheless, it is significant that the United States NAO accepted to hear complaints 
filed by the United Electrical Workers and the Teamsters in 1994, even in the face of 
protests by U.S. business groups and Mexican government officials. In addition, a group 
of labor rights non-governmental organizations filed a third complaint in August 1994 
against a Sony plant in Nuevo Laredo. While these hearings are not likely to lead to 
fines or trade sanctions, U.S. unions filing these complaints can hope that the publicity 
will serve to pressure U.S. companies operating in Mexico to alter their practices 
regarding union organizing by Mexican workers (see Myerson 1994:D1, D4; Davis 
1994). 
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